Post #2120: Oh, the price of gold is still rising out of sight

 

Gold blew through $3100 $3200 an ounce this morning.

 

As noted in prior posts, an increase in the price of gold is never a good thing.

Looking on the bright side, a good chunk of this last push was merely from dollar going down the toilet. 

That should happen because gold is an internationally-traded commodity.  It’s a global market.  When the value of the dollar falls, the value of gold, expressed in those dollars, rises.

I guess I need to start a countdown or something, as by my calculation, if gold tops $3519 (or so), that will be its all-time high in inflation-adjusted (CPI-adjusted) terms.

So, right now, gold is just (1- $3234 / $3519 =~) 8% below its all time high, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms.

I described the economic conditions under which gold set its previous high, in a recent post on this topic:

Post #2112: Oh, the price of gold is rising out of sight

Before that, my most recent prior post on this topic was from half a year ago:

Post #2017: The price of gold is up. That’s never good.

Post #2119: Schrödinger’s Tariff, II

 

Further reflections on our current tariff situation.

Photo Source, Nobel foundation – http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1933/schrodinger-bio.html, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6209244

 

 

 

 

 


Point 1:  This sort of thing — the current tariff situation — is part and parcel of the “unitary executive” package that MAGA installed in the Federal government.

1.1  If you concentrate all the power in the hands of an individual, as the MAGA party has succeeded in doing, here in the U.S., with few-to-no effective restraints (e.g., Congress cedes control, Supreme Court defers, ignore everybody else),

1.2  And if The Leader has some wacky ideas, is unteachable, perhaps easily influenced, aging, …

1.3  You’re stuck with The Leader’s decisions, anyway, because that’s how you set it up.

Stripping away our long-standing system of checks and balances is an inherently high-variance strategy.  People imagine great governing by a philosopher-king.  But you can get kleptocracy. Sometimes kakistocrasty.  Not to exclude both at once.

And sometimes, in some important areas, unleashing The Leader is a dangerously crazy thing to do.

In hindsight, I’d like to think that a lot of our leadership now realizes that giving this man (the President), this weapon (unlimited control over tariffs) was not a good idea.

But as long as the House continues to take this lying down, there is no off button.

Checks and balances.  Maybe God got that part right.

I miss checks and balances.

Addendum:  And, after reading Krugman’s piece this morning, I’d maybe go so far as to say that the fundamental uncertainty of unitary-executive decision-making is incompatible with the traditional role of dollar-denominated assets as safe-haven assets.  These idiots may have just managed to dislodge the dollar from its role as the foundation currency of the international financial system, because we can no longer be trusted.


Point 2:  Do we need a Central Committee now?

How do other authoritarian regimes avoid this problem?  This problem being the potential for The Leader to make spectacularly crap decisions, against all sane advice?

Maybe they don’t.  Here I’m thinking of some of the initiatives under Mao, at least some of which almost surely impoverished the Chinese people.  Stalin’s planting of Lysenko’s wheat, maybe.

So, this may simply be an unacknowledged downside of the unitary-executive approach to Federal government.  You will get some nut-job decisions on really important issues, and you have given yourself no recourse.

Anyway, if we’re tossing all the old-fashioned checks and balances, is it really optimal to put nothing in their place?  That’s looking like a big “no”, to me.

So I wonder if we might take some clues from successful autocracies elsewhere.  Maybe we need some new entity — the King’s Privy Council, the Party Central Committee, the Gang of Eight — to provide some filtering beyond whatever occurs within The Leader’s brain.

I don’t think a Cabinet full of sycophants fulfills this role.  I wish the MAGAs would come up with something that does.  They’re running this show.

Post #2118: Schrödinger’s Tariff.

 

Surely you can complete the joke yourself.

Photo Source, Nobel foundation – http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1933/schrodinger-bio.html, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6209244

 


Any given Trump tariff is neither alive nor dead …  until I open up the box each morning and look inside.

And, to take the analogy one step further, for the the un-predictable decay of an atomic nucleus, substitute the un-predictable flipping of some neuron or neurons, in Trump’s aging brain.

To be fair, maybe by flailing about, with this pain-inflicting flail marked “tariff”, he’s somehow making things better, by beating down the opposition.  Or beating “them” down, more than “us”.  Or something.

But then reality takes hold and you have to say, “Yeah, like beating the hell out of Canada for all the bad things they were doing to us.”  Didn’t we even have a free-trade agreement with those guys, going into this?  What dummy signed that?

And and and.  And what does fentanyl have to do with aluminum and steel in the first place.  And what does Canada have to do with our fentanyl problem?  The answers are nothing, and next to it, and plenty more where those came from..  Car industry integration.  Mexico.  And and and.

So, no, at best I’ll have to think of these as Schrödinger’s tariffs.  And as such, they are fundamentally different from the tariffs of the past.

Note that I do not say “better”.   But different, for sure.

Post #2117: Some More of God’s Greatest Mistakes

 

I stole that from Douglas Adams.  But this post sort of feels like that, because this post is about an issue with the Constitution.

Recall that, originally, the Constitution called for the winner of the presidential election to be President, and for the second-place finisher to be Vice-President.  Presumably, then, President and Vice-President were from different parties. 

As a consequence, under that original system, if you impeached (and convicted) a President, then you automatically ceded the Presidency to the opposite party.   For example, if the President did crazy stuff via Executive Order, you could impeach, convict, remove, and so stop that.

But now, if they impeach the President, all that does is put another guy in place, to implement the rest of Project 2025.  Under these conditions, you cannot use impeachment as a way to slow or halt the implementation of the polices that got the current President impeached.

(Impeach, say, if a great depression occurs, and the Trump tariffs get the blame for triggering it.)

Plausibly, that’s consistent with the “high crimes and misdemeanors” clause.  They were thinking of impeachment as a way to remove a single rotten apple, not as a way to implement or (in this case halt) policies.


Conclusion

I guess I keep looking for the off button.  The plug that may be pulled.  The glass, only to be broken in emergency.

Plausibly, under the original rules, impeachment was a tool that could have been used if the U.S. were headed off a cliff, on the path set by the current President.

But under current rules, that’s no longer true.  Impeachment is no longer a tool for getting the U.S. off this path, no matter what happens.

I wonder if the Founding Fathers had any notion of what our current situation would be?  Surely they didn’t foresee government by executive order, or the Congress abandoning its legal prerogatives over spending.

Basically, there is no off button.  Wherever this leads, we just have to deal with it.

So far, every time I think we’ve finally reached a high-water mark for crazy, the world proves me wrong.  Today, the U.S. tariff on all Chinese imported goods is 145%.  But the Chinese tariff on selected U.S. goods is only about 85%.  (Maybe they need another day to catch up.)

Against recent history of single-digit average tariff levels for most of the developed world. Economist Paul Krugman characterizes this as the largest international trade shock ever.

Gold is nearing $3200 an ounce, about $350 shy of its all-time peak, in real (CPI-adjusted) terms.  That’s never a good sign.

This is not going to end well.

At some point, in the not-too-distant future, I think the U.S.A. is going to be scrambling for the off button.  Only to realize there isn’t one.

Post 2116: Weight loss, meet Trump-o-nomics.

 

Suddenly, it seems to me that I haven’t saved enough for my retirement.

Which is a pity, as I am already retired, and have been for some years.


What changed?

First, realize that a good chunk of my wealth is tied up in my house.  It’s in Vienna, VA, in a Northern Virginia economy strongly dependent on federal employees and federal spending.

Ah.  At this point, I think there should be an expectation of falling real estate values around here.  But who knows.  Flat-at-best, say.  That, versus prior thinking that real estate always appreciates, right?

Next, by dropping (now) 95 pounds of weight, my (subjective) life expectancy should be … longer.  That’s a good thing.   But it does have a downside, which is more years of life over which to spread out the available money.

And, now, third, the rest of Trump-o-nomics.  The tariffs alone pretty much guarantee poor returns to a financial portfolio in the short run, and who knows how much lost productivity in the long run.  The significantly-heightened threat of a global recession just adds to portfolio-return angst.


Conclusion:

The world has changed since I set aside funds for my retirement.

What seemed like a slam-dunk, asset-wise, now no longer looks quite so bulletproof.  My house probably should lose value, in response to the throttling of Federal employment and spending.  Surely, tariffs and whatnot will do the same for the value of my 401K (equivalent).

Simultaneously, a consequence of weight loss is that I should plan to need money  longer.

Weight loss plus Trump-o-nomics.  A double whammy.

I never planned for either of them.

Post #2115: Some round number estimates of tariff impact

 

Source for image:  The Far Side.

Edit:  Skip this, just read the “days and weeks” quote that came out Sunday evening 4/6/2025, from Commerce Secretary Lutnik, shown at the end of the post.  Looks like somebody in the administration has finally figured out that this is a terrible idea, and they are now looking for a way to declare victory and call the whole thing off.

At least, that’s what I hope the quote from Lutnik means.

Don’t focus on the microeconomic effects.

I could recite the Econ 101 of Why Tariffs are Bad.  But the picture to the left illustrates the gist.

The popular press tends to focus on the “microeconomics” of the situation.  That is, the impact on a single product or industry, alone.  E.g., here’s what this will do to the price of a car, and so on.  Here’s why a steel tariff is good for steel makers, but not for industries that build things out of steel.

To be clear, real (that is, mainstream, having-a-degree-in-the-subject) economists hate tariffs.  Boiled down, from an industry-level perspective, tariffs are not merely a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, they ensure that both Peter and Paul work less efficiently than they could, thus making everybody worse off, on average.  It’s one of those things about which there is widespread agreement among mainstream economists, backed up by decades of evidence.

Except in a handful of cases, in the modern economy, tariffs are little more than a seductive way to shoot yourself in the foot.

Simply put, any amount of money you think you can raise with tariffs, you can raise that more efficiently, resulting in higher GDP and higher employment, if you raise that with an income tax.  But, as I have previously noted, since the whole point of the Trump tariff is to substitute sales (consumption) taxes on the middle class, for income taxes on the wealthy, that point is not salient to the current administration’s thinking.


Focus on some round-number macroeconomics instead.

In round numbers, I’m guessing that the first-year revenues from the Trump tariff will be roughly the size of the U.S. budget for the Department of Defense.  (I’ll present the estimate below, such as it is.)

What would you expect to happen to the economy if the Feds shut down the Department of Defense, all at once, on some random Wednesday? Forever.   And then simply pocketed what used to be spent, thus removing that from aggregate demand for U.S. goods and services?  (Though, in reality, simply borrowing less to make up for the remaining annual budget deficit.)

My best guess is that the amount of money collected by the Trump tariff will be about the size of U.S. Defense spending.

So withdrawing that money, out of U.S. aggregate demand, via tariffs, ought to have about the same impact as closing the DoD and not increasing Federal spending.

Best guess, this should roughly double unemployment, as it works its way through economy in the short run.  Call that year.

So, my prediction, FWIW, is that U.S. unemployment will 7.9%, in April 2026.

Like so:

The only sleight-of-hand above is the “fiscal multiplier”, for which you are invited to take your own guess, if you don’t like mine.  That’s to capture the immediate follow-on effects of the initial drop in U.S. aggregate demand caused by the tax increase (the tariff) assuming no offsetting federal spending increase.  The Fiscal Multiplier is an abstract notion, meant to capture the diffusion of spending across the economy, but in concept it’s no different from when the the local factory shuts down, and the local bars and restaurants soon follow suit.  The actual reduction in economic activity, from the original shuttering of the factory, is somewhat larger than the loss of the factory jobs alone.  How much larger, on average, that’s subject to debate.  And, given that we don’t even know what the fallout of this is going to be, on consumer prices, it’s a bit early to have that debate.  So 1.5 is a nice round number, and frequently appears within the range of what sane people, those more learn-ed than I in this matter, find plausible.


What about the long run?

An eight-percent unemployment rate is a recession, for sure, but hardly the end of the world as we know it.  To get to the real potential for calamity, we need to speculate on what happens in the long run.

First, elasticity of demand — the reaction to the price changes — should be very nearly a wash.  And that’s because it applies to both our imports of foreign goods, and to foreigners’ imports of our goods.  Surely, we will use less of the now-pricier imports, all other things equal.  But so will foreigners, of our goods.

As predicted (and sometimes pre-announced), our trading partners have wasted no time imposing tariffs on their imports of American goods.  And so, if the average price elasticity of imports and exports is about the same, and if foreigners impose tariffs on our goods equal to our tariffs on theirs, then the net moderating effect of price elasticity should be a wash.  Our demand for foreign goods will decline, reducing the size of this new tax.  But at the same time, foreign demand for U.S. goods will decline, as they impose their retaliatory tariffs.  The dollar value of our goods imports and exports are not hugely different ($3.3T vs $2.1T).  As long as demand elasticities for imports and exports are about the same, these effects should roughly cancel.

The real uncertainty is in what else might happen.

Once these tariffs take this chunk of spending out of U.S. aggregate demand, then the economy is, for want of a better term, biased toward recession.  Like a rock on a slope.  Nudge it hard, and it now has a tendency to roll further downhill.  Anything from general loss of confidence, to a world-wide economic downturn — will feed into the unemployment increase created by the tariffs.

Nobody has a clue how that will work out.  But for sure, all of those factors are more of a worry in the context of an U.S. economy that is already surely headed for recession.

On account of the trade war we started.


Conclusion

A major recession is already baked in.

That’s purely from withdrawing 2.5% of U.S. aggregate demand, via these new taxes on imports, and not spending it.

Maybe the Republicans will succeed in giving that money to the wealthy, in the form of further tax cuts.  But the wealthy have a low “marginal propensity to consume out of current income”, meaning that they save most of their income, rather than spend it.  In an ugly business climate, where nobody is willing to take that (now-)excess savings and invest it, that still creates the conditions for recession.  Softens the blow to aggregate demand a bit, to take those sales taxes an, in effect, shovel them into the pockets of the  wealthy.  But you can’t make the wealthy spend their additional income.  As economic policy, this is classic “you can’t push on a string”.

At this point, the question isn’t whether jerking the U.S. economy around like this is a good idea.  It’s not.  We’re going to get at least a major recession out of it, in short order, just from the sheer size and abruptness of it.  That part has nothing to do with imports and exports per se.  Any tax hike amounting to 2.5% of GDP, with no offsetting increase in Federal spending, would do the same.

The only question is, how bad is this going to get?

At this point, we’ve all-but-destroyed NATO, abandoned an ally in the middle of a war (to the point of withholding intelligence information, which shows the treatment of Ukraine isn’t about the money), torn up all of our international trade agreements, … .   And we’re not three months into it yet.

Putin could not have asked for a better return on investment.  Pardon me while I go buy some shares in Deutsche Bank now.


Addendum:  Emily Litella lives!

I read this quote below, and just about lost it.  Here’s the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, just up on the CNBC website, emphasis mine:

 

 

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said Sunday ... 

“There is no postponing. They are definitely going to stay in place for days and weeks,” Lutnick said. ...

All this chaos, with literal trillions of stock-market losses, making enemies of former friends like Canada, killing consumer and business confidence, likely tipping the U.S. in recession, but the plan is now to keep those tariffs in place for days.  Maybe even for whole entire weeks, if need be.  All that, so that Trump can have foreign governments kiss his ring, and cut side-deals to have their tariffs lowered?

And then say “never mind”?

There’s stupid, and then there’s crazy stupid.

That’s so stupid, it’s not credible.  There’s no way that “days” of tariffs was the original plan.

The only thing that makes sense is that the Trump administration is (finally!) seeing what a bad idea this is.  They of course will never admit to making a mistake.  So this has the look of a trial balloon, for ending this trade war by declaring victory and going home.

So they can save face, declare this a huge win instead of the huge blunder that it was, blame the liberal media, or maybe Biden, and move on.

If so, you really have to wonder what’s next.

Maybe they’ll pretend to launch some nukes, just to see what happens.

Post #2114: Wherein I ‘splain the Trump tariff formula.

 

That economy/tariff formula thingy.

People are completely misinterpreting that Trump tariff formula.

Allow me to ‘splain it to you.

Source:  Snopes.

 


What is that thing:

Legal issues aside — and I sure as hell hope there are some — this is a tariff formula that can be made permanent.  It can be updated periodically without requiring additional intervention by The President.  He can just state that (e.g.) this levy will be updated annually, or every N years.

It’s not a description of reality.  It’s not intended to be.

It is not a prediction of what will happen if such a tariff were imposed.  Or a realistic model of any import-export market or market for such goods in general.

Again, it’s not intended to be.

What is that formula is, is, it’s a proposed policy going forward:   If I’ve read it all correctly it says you propose to:

Raise (your citizens’s) prices for foreign goods (from a country) in proportion to (half) that country’s goods-trade surplus with the U.S.

(Half is not shown above, but was deduced — see Snopes for attribution (reference Snopes).  (Plus  some minimum of base rate of, I think, 10%.  Or something.  Everybody pays the vigorish, some pay more.)

We can debate the many, many drawbacks of tariffs set in this fashion.  And should.

Particularly because the penguins have revealed to me how they can update this from year to year with little effort.


Penguins mean permanence, you fools!

 

Here’s how I can see how Norfolk Island got into this. I’m making all this up, yet I’ve been there, data-wise, myself.

The Trump administration likely inherited the Norfolk Island error from whatever actual Federal Government accounting data source they used.  The explanation I heard is that this is most likely keyboard input error driven by drop-down lists.  They thought they clicked one of the many Norfolks that have ports, but (say once per 10K clicks) mistakenly hit Norfolk Island instead.  (Though, why that would be a choice on the menu, I do not know.)

The Liberal Media seem to be laughing at this (totally harmless) error in the tariffs as-published.

Nobody seems to realize that, once you adopt that formula as the basis, then as long as those underlying government accounts get updated over time (and they do), then you can automatically update your tariffs.

You can now easily make this permanent, with no additional effort on the part of The President.

(Except in times of Additional Emergency, as-declared by said President.)

So this becomes the baseline tariff.

For-ev-er.


The hhhpt test, or check now for a sharp inhation of breath.

Arguably the best piece of advice I got, starting out as an independent consultant, was couresy of Jon Gabel, who gave me the following advice on setting your hourly rate.  What he termed the hhhpt test.  If you mention your hour rate to a prospective client, and you do not hear a sharp intake of breath, then you have set it too low.

Permanent, large, arbitrary tariffs on goods, that only go away if the U.S. balances its trade separately with each and every country, individually.

Phhht.


The added policy wrinkle of feasible permanence.

My unfortunate task is to point out what this policy does.

If you can argue that the tariffs are permanent, then you can use that money to make your tax cuts for the wealthy permanent.

And if you succeed in doing that, then you effectively substitute sales tax for income tax.

And that, my friends, is a long-cherished policy goal of the American right.

I don’t agree with it.  I think it’s a pity they have to burn down the economy trying to achieve it this way.

But the bottom line, if successful, will be a partial substitution of sales taxes for income taxes.  Compared to an alternative world where enough Republican members of the Congress can’t stomach increasing the national debt in order to extend the Trump tax cuts, this allows them to get closer to the goal of eliminating income tax entirely, by using taxes on goods to offset the lost taxes on income.


Lipstick on a pig, or have you noticed the global trade war that hasn’t broke out?

At the end of the day, those Greek letters are just lipstick on a pig.  Meaning, I’m not even going to get into all the reasons economists and business people think this is bad, bad policy.  Zero doubt that this is a pig of a policy.  I mean, WSJ, “dumbest trade war in history” and all that.

But have you noticed the global trade war that hasn’t broken out?  How nobody is copying us, in the sense of enacting tariffs against all of their neighbors.  You can easily miss that through US-centric reporting.  But, e.g., the Chinese have not imposed additional tariffs on Canadian goods.  Nor vice versa.

Instead, all the tariff action has been countries reacting (appropriately) to U.S. tariffs.  What you have not seen is countries then going off to have their own tariff wars against their own neighbors.

So, if you want a quick reality test on how smart this tariff policy is?

Look at how many countries are following in our footsteps.

Nobody.  This is so insanely stupid that nobody is following our lead.

Let’s hope we eventually take a clue from that.

Post #2112: Oh, the price of gold is rising out of sight

 

Oh the price of gold is rising out of sight
And the dollar is in sorry shape tonight
What the dollar used to get us now won’t buy a head of lettuce
No the economic forecast isn’t right
But amidst the clouds I spot a shining ray
I can even glimpse a new and better way
And I’ve devised a plan of action worked it down to the last fraction
And I’m going into action here today.

From:  I’m changing my name to Chrysler, recorded by Arlo Guthrie.


Gold blew through $3100 an ounce this morning.

When the stock market is making new highs, everybody steps up to take credit for it.

But gold?  Nope. Nobody ever takes credit for a rising price of gold.  Given the cheapness and ubiquity of public lies these days, you’d think some prominent braggart would try.  But nobody ever tries to own a rise in the price of gold.   That’s because a rapidly rising price of gold is never good news.  And peaks in the price of gold tend to occur when the 💩 is in the process of hitting the 🚁.

What caught my eye about $3100 is that this has to be getting close to setting a new record for the price of gold in real (inflation-adjusted) terms.  (In the modern era, where the dollar price of gold has been allowed to float.  Post-1970, say.)

If I take the prior price peaks (red arrows I added to the chart above) and use the BLS inflation calculator to express them in 2025 dollars, I find that we’re now just 14% below the all-time high price of gold in real (inflation-adjusted) terms.

So, when Guthrie sang about the rising price of gold, in the context of the 1979 bail-out of Chrysler, following two Arab oil embargoes, the resulting energy crises, two long, deep U.S. recessions, and the near-destruction of the U.S. auto industry with its lack of energy-efficient cars, in a context of persistent double-digit rates of inflation … the price of gold, in real terms, was somewhat higher than it is today.

I’m trying to take some comfort in that.  Either things aren’t as bad now, as they were then.  Or they aren’t as bad, yet.

Either way: Eat, drink and be merry.

My most recent prior post on this topic was from half a year ago:

Post #2017: The price of gold is up. That’s never good.

Post #2110: Filibuster is a one-directional filter, an apology for Democratic inertia.

 

This is a  brief note-to-self on the one-way nature of the filibuster.

The Democrats in the Congress seem to be getting some grief for not doing much to stop the dismantling/destruction of fill-in-the-blank (the Federal government, NATO, international trade, our system of justice, and so on).

And while that is true, to all appearances, I think it’s mostly the case that there’s not much they can do.

Which brings me to the filibuster, as I understand it.  In the Senate, if the majority is under 60%, the minority party can use the filibuster rules to stop new legislation from being passed.  Or considered.  Whatever.

The operative phrase there is “stop new legislation”.  The filibuster allows the (significant) minority party in the Senate to stop the opposing party’s new legislative initiatives.

But suppose stopping legislation isn’t your problem.  Instead, in this case, you are begging for The Senate to Take Some Action.  (That’s more-or-less what you’re calling for.  Which, for the Senate, I think means passing something.)  And nothing is happening, despite apparent gross overstep of the Executive.

In the current situation, the filibuster doesn’t do spit for the minority party.  The action of the majority can be stopped.  The inaction of the majority can’t.

As I see it, Republicans in the Congress have given up enforcing some basic tenets of the Constitution.  Which, as with all laws, only really exist if they are enforced, or at least believed to be enforced.

I can only assume that, in exchange, this allows the Executive to do things they (Republicans in the Congress) agree with, without having to pass laws to achieve those outcomes.  An ends-justify-means thing, maybe.

The moral of the story is that if the Republican Congress won’t enforce the Constitution — and I think Jan 6 made that clear — those parts of the law that would require the Congress to step up to the plate are suspended.

This is as good an explanation as any of having entered an era where any legal fig leaf will do.  Hence the spate of hitherto-unrecognized national emergencies.  E.g, Fentany smuggling at the Canadian border justifies a 25% tariff on Canadian metals and machinery.  And if that just chops apart the North American car assembly system — except maybe Tesla — then, well, oops.

This is classic bad policy-making.  And it’s what we get, with an autocrat.


Conclusion

I don’t think the Founding Fathers anticipated having a branch of government simply refuse to defend its legal prerogatives.  That is, a Congress enabling the President to do as he pleases.

At the extreme, if the House won’t impeach, and the Senate won’t convict, no matter what, there can be no constitutional crisis.  The flip side of which is that any law that requires enforcement by action of the Congress is effectively suspended for the duration, at the convenience of the President.

And for the minority party of the Senate, where filibuster is your main tool, I think you’re just kind of out of luck.  You’ll be allotted your time to speak in public hearings.  I think the Senate still functions to that extent.  Beyond that, it’s a Republican Congress, they seem to be OK with this, and there’s nothing you can do to change that.

Two years of this is locked in.  Plan accordingly.